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 Abstract 
 
The present study examines whether the demographic components fertility and migration are 
related among 27 European countries. From the 1970s fertility levels have decreased and the 
life expectancy has risen, which has led to both ageing and shrinking populations sizes in 
Europe. The United Nations (2000) and the European Union (2006) have thus recommended 
immigration as one solution to address the population decline. By performing cross-sectional 
analyses, this study investigates the statistical association between total fertility rates and net 
migration rate per capita in 1997 and 2017. The general finding is that fertility levels do not 
have any effect on migration rates both years. This implies that migration is mainly shaped by 
other incentives such as push and pull factors and not by levels of fertility. The results show 
however two positive associations in 1997, which is an outcome of Cyprus and Malta’s strong 
impact in the regression analyses due to the countries’ different levels of fertility and migration 
in comparison to the other twenty-five countries here. In addition, higher economic 
development associates with higher migration rates in both 1997 and 2017 and the southern 
regimes have the highest migration rates in 1997 among the welfare state regime types.  
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1. Introduction and Background 
Population structure depends on three components: fertility, mortality and migration. During 
the last hundred years European societies have faced dramatic changes in these three 
demographic domains and the current study will focus on fertility and migration rates1. Today 
European states face the two demographic challenges population decline and population 
ageing due to continuously low fertility levels together with increased longevity. The 
population size of the European Union (EU) is expected to decrease from 493 million 
inhabitants in 2010 to 472 million by 2050 which is the lowest population growth among the 
world regions (van Nimwegen & van der Erf, 2010 p. 1359-1360).  
 
Birth rates have steadily declined in the aftermath of what has been called the “baby boom”- 
period after World War II (McDonald & Kippen, 2001 p. 1). The large cohorts2 born in the 
1950s and 1960s have caused below replacement level in Europe, which means that the number 
of new-borns does not reach the amount of people of the former generation. In order to renew 
the population size the suggested total fertility rate (TFR) is 2.1 births per woman for all 
member states of the European Union (EU) (COM(2005) 94). However, the average has been 
and is around 1.5 (World Bank data, 2017a). In several countries such as Italy and Spain levels 
of 1.3 births per women have generated the term “lowest-low” – levels within the research field 
(Billari & Dalla-Zuanna, 2011 p. 105; Baird et al., 2010 p. 592). The overall decline of fertility 
levels is not only a result of fewer births, but also an effect of the postponement of family 
formation in Europe (Billari, 2008 p. 4; van Nimwegen & van der Erf, 2010 p. 1263-1264). 
The absolute number of births plays a significant role in population dynamics whereas the size 
of a birth cohort eventually becomes the labour force of a country (Billari & Dalla-Zuanna, 
2011 p. 106). The big baby-boom cohorts will soon put pressure on fiscal sustainability because 
the proportion of elderly will be larger at the same time as the share of citizens in working-age 
will be smaller3. Therefore, European national governments will have to increase retirement 
ages and tax rates, cut pensions and make health care provision more efficient (European 
Union, 2000 p. 91; Goldstein & Kluge, 2016 p. 302-303). The literature refers to these 
                                                 
1 Mortality levels as a component will be left out because of its limited role on population growth whilst fertility 
and migration have a direct impact to population growth/decline (Wilson et al., 2013 p. 131). 
2 Definition of cohort: A group of people with common characteristics. Often used for statistical purpose. In this 
research field cohort refers to the group of people born the same year (Collins Dictionary, 2020). 
3 See demographic pyramid 2016 and 2080 of the EU population (Eurostat, 2017) in Appendix 1. 
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fundamental upcoming challenges for European welfare states as a demographic crisis (Berg 
& Spehar, 2011 p. 25, 100). 
 
International migration is a key determinant of population sizes and has become a main driver 
for the overall population growth in Europe in the absence of increasing fertility levels (van 
Nimwegen & van der Erf, 2010 p. 1362). The United Nations (UN) published a report in 2000 
that recommended an enormous increase of immigration to the then fifteen EU member states 
among other world regions. The report founded the term replacement migration, which implies 
to the amount of international immigration needed to counteract declining and ageing 
population sizes (UN, 2000 p. 7). The two main ambitions regarding the EU were to (1) keep 
the size of the working-age population and to (2) maintain the potential support ratio4 (PSR) at 
1995 levels by 2050. To maintain the size of the group of people in working-age an average of 
1.4 million immigrants every year between 1995-2050 was proposed, and 12.7 million 
immigrants were required to manage the PSR constant (European Union, 2000 p. 90-91). Also, 
the EU Commission (2006) report stated that a net annual migration rate of 1 million 
immigrants over the next forty years is needed to secure the demographic balance of the EU 
(COM(2006) 571). Besides, The European Bank Federation states that fertility rates ought to 
increase to secure the same levels of labour force participation based on concerns regarding 
competitiveness on the global market and public finance (Lutz & Skirbekk, 2005 p. 699). 
 
From the 1990s onwards five major events have occurred that have had a major impact on 
migration in Europe. The first event was the fall of the Soviet Union, which led to East-West 
migration. This was followed by the war in former Yugoslavia, which caused large numbers 
of refugees. Thirdly, there was the Eastern enlargement of 12 new EU member states in 2004 
and 2007, which again generated East-West migration and the fourth event was the financial 
crisis of 2008. The recession led to a decline in international immigration while the intra-
European migration increased from the worst hit countries towards those that managed better 
(de la Rica, Glitz & Ortega, 2019 p. 1307). Lastly, the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 generated 
large international immigration flows to the EU (Winter, 2019 p. 2).  
 
                                                 
4 Potential support ratio: number of people aged 15-64 (working-age) for each person aged 65 or older (elderly) 
(European Union, 2000 p. 89). 
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1.1 Aim  
Higher birth and migration rates are two solutions to combat the demographic crisis in Europe. 
Both the UN (2000) and the EU Commission (2006) advocated that immigration is needed to 
address the problem of shrinking population sizes due to the low fertility levels in Europe. This 
study contributes with an understanding of whether fertility and migration rates are associated 
and to what extent among 27 European member states the years 1997 and 2017 before and after 
several large-scale migration flows.  
 
1.2 Disposition 
This study contains six sections. The next section, section 2, presents theory and previous 
research on fertility and migration rates. The research question and hypothesis follow. Section 
4 discusses the choice of method and data, the selection of countries and years, and variables 
in the study. In section 5, the results are presented. Finally, the concluding discussion and 
suggestions for further research are provided in section 6. 
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2. Theory and Previous Research 
 
2.1 Theory  
The major line of literature that studies the association between fertility and migration is that 
of replacement migration. The replacement migration literature asserts that immigration flows 
can substitute “missing” births in shrinking population sizes. I will present the main studies 
regarding replacement migration mainly in European states, which have been carried out by 
Billari (2008), Billari & Dalla-Zuanna (2011), and Wilson et al. (2013). After presenting this 
approach I will give examples of critics, which argue that the idea of higher immigration as a 
solution to decreasing population sizes as proposed by the UN (2000) is too simplified and 
unrealistic. Further, the literature on fertility and migration will be presented in order to stress 
that the association could be in the opposite direction since this thesis do not examine the 
causality. I will then introduce various established push and pull factors, which explain 
incentives behind cross-country differences in immigration levels in Europe. Finally, a short 
discussion is presented of the welfare state and migration, as well as the effect of women’s 
labour market participation on the demographic structure. 
The thesis intends to examine whether fertility levels associate with migration rates in the years 
1997 and 2017 at a European-level by investigating twenty-six existing European member 
states plus the United Kingdom. Cross-sectional studies and regression analyses with 3 control 
variables will be carried out to find out to what extent fertility and migration might relate. The 
net migration rates include five-year estimates collected from the World Bank database and 
will thereby cover two periods in our recent history that have been strongly influenced by high 
migration streams. It should be noted that this is neither a study of replacement migration nor 
an analysis of a new pull factor. The results aim to give us insight into if and to what extent 
two out the three demographic pillars: fertility and migration, are statistically associated. 
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2.2 Replacement migration   
Replacement migration has become a broad label for when immigrants “replace” missing births 
and was introduced in the UN’s report in 2000 (Billari & Dalla-Zuanna, 2011 p. 106, UN, 
2000). Billari (2008) claims that replacement migration has occurred amongst the 21 largest 
member states of the EU. Countries that had the largest decrease in fertility levels between the 
cohorts born in 1964 and 1984 experienced the highest rates of immigration twenty years later 
in 2004. In other words, Billari (2008) found statistical proof for a negative correlation between 
fertility and migration rates on a European-level. This 40-year perspective (between 1964 and 
2004) illustrates firstly the differences of numbers of births between the mothers’ cohorts in 
1964 to those of their children in 1984. Secondly, 20 years later in 2004 net migration rates 
were analysed in order to frame the labour market needs by the time the cohorts of 1984 became 
20 years old and presumably had entered the labour market. Italy and Spain were the two 
countries with extremely low levels of fertility and very high rates of immigration in 2004, 
which affected the result of replacement migration (Billari, 2008 p. 12, 14, 16). In a second 
study, Billari & Dalla- Zuanna (2011) look closer at Spain and Italy which have had a TFR 
under or around 1.3 since the 1990s and found that by the beginning of the 21st-century 
immigrants stopped the population decline despite the consistent lowest-low fertility levels. 
This being said, Italy and Spain experience a “zero population growth” by means of 
replacement migration (Billari & Dalla-Zuanna, 2011 p. 105). In addition, they claim that birth-
cohort replacement migration5 has occurred in Spain, the UK, and the United States while not 
in Italy, Germany, France, South Korea, or Japan (Billari & Dalla-Zuanna, 2011 p. 108). 
Wilson et al. (2013) point out that regardless of the importance of studies of replacement 
migration there is not yet any typical standard for measuring it. They argue that migration is an 
unstable segment of demographic studies because data is given annually and collected 
differently between countries, resulting in long-term ambiguous predictions. There is also a 
lack of demographic forecasts due to the uncertainty about who will migrate, and thereby which 
group of the native population the immigrants eventually will replace. That being said, 
immigrants have frequently been shown to be mostly young teenagers or in working-ages 
(Wilson et al., 2013 p. 133-134). Specifically, labour migrants often move as young adults and 
can therefore contribute to cohorts of women aged 15 to 30 in Europe (Simpson, 2017 p. 7). 
                                                 
5 Birth-cohort replacement migration compares the size of birth cohorts as it ages to the fixed cohort of the 
mothers at the time the babies were born (Billari & Dalla-Zuanna, 2011 p. 108; Wilson et al., 2013, p. 134). 
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Wilson et al.’s (2013) show how intergenerational replacement, as they rather like to call it 
instead of the questionable term replacement migration, has taken place in European countries. 
They examine population replacement by investigating selected birth cohorts between 1972-
1995 and follow them up until 30 years of age (or until 2011) amongst the EU-15 countries6. 
Population replacement refers to how migration alters the size for either a certain age-specific 
cohort or a whole population and does not calculate for biological reproduction 7 . 
Hypothetically, a population that has encountered population replacement can have no domestic 
births, but only a huge inflow of migrants and thus be replaced by migration. They choose the 
cohort of 1972 as the earliest year because by that time TFR was falling below replacement 
level for the first time. They use the overall replacement ratio (ORR) that examines the impact 
of female birth cohorts locating in the new country divided by the average annual size of the 
mothers’ cohorts already living in the country (Wilson et al., 2013 p. 134-135). Their findings 
show how the ORRs moves in upward trends on average in the EU (EU-15) to levels of 
intergenerational replacement as each cohort ages due to female immigrants. The younger 
cohorts born in 1990 and 1995 indicate that population replacement will be reached in the 
upcoming short future. In addition, they show that Belgium, France, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
UK, Italy, Spain, Czech Republic, and Hungary have levels of migration that have led far 
beyond population replacement while cohorts in Germany, Bulgaria, and Latvia had not reached 
levels of population replacement (Wilson et al., 2013 p. 138, 142-145, 149). Wilson et al. (2013) 
study confirms previous studies which show that Spain and Italy have experienced replacement 
migration (see also Billari 2008; Billari & Dalla-Zuanna (2011). 
  
2.3 Critique of replacement migration  
Espenshade (2001) is one of many opponents to the idea about replacement migration arguing 
that it should be more closely linked to social science and economics than simply suggesting 
increasing immigration (Espenshade, 2001 p. 383). Keely (2009) argues that migration is not 
an efficient solution to stabilize population sizes in comparison to pro-fertility policies. He 
argues that while the arrival of one migrant happens once, childbearing can contribute with 
more humans in societies. An example of pro-fertility policies is the parental allowance that 
                                                 
6 Another approach is birth replacement, which aims at understanding how births of immigrant contribute to the 
native birth cohorts (Wilson et al, 2013 p. 134). 
7  Billari’s (2008) measurement is an example of that (Billari, 2008 p.14) 
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facilitates new parents’ way back to the labour market. Parental allowance ought to encourage 
adults’ own choice of the number of children, regardless of factors such as income or job 
opportunities (Lane, Spehar & Johansson, 2011 p.128). Also, Keely (2009) rejects the notion 
of migration as a solution for the demographic crisis on the one hand because there is no 
guarantee that female migrants are in their reproductive age or soon will be. On the other hand, 
he insists that an enormous supply of immigrants is not realistic in social, economic and 
political terms. Nevertheless, Keely (2009) means that higher immigration is one of several 
options for addressing the European states’ societal problems due to shrinking population sizes 
(Keely, 2009 p. 397, 402). 
 
2.4 Immigrants impact on fertility  
The research on fertility and migration is filled with studies on the reversed causality: how 
immigration impacts fertility and childbearing trends both at a national level and on an 
individual level. For example at the national level, Sobotka (2008) found that immigrants’ 
fertility patterns net effect on the overall TFR in European countries was around 0.1. It applied 
to Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the region of Flanders in Belgium around year 
2000. In larger European cities immigrants’ births have contributed to half of the total number 
of births. However, an impact of 0.1 TFR is rather modest, which means that many factors 
among native women also influence total fertility rates (Sobotka, 2008 p. 228-229). 
At the individual level, studies have found that immigrant women tend to have higher total 
fertility rates than those of native populations in Europe, but there is a large heterogeneity 
amongst migrants depending on their culture of origin (Sobotka, 2008 p. 231, 233). During 
2005-2018, immigrant Muslims had 62 percent higher levels of TFR than native European 
citizens, while native Muslims had 19 percent higher TFR (Stonawski Potančoková & Skirbekk 
2016 p. 555-556). Stonawski et al. (2016) conclude that the socio-economic status of immigrant 
women explains their higher fertility levels to a greater extent than to the religious belonging, 
in this case, Islam (Stonawski et al., 2016 p. 562). Childbearing patterns are also shaped by the 
cause of migration. For instance, labour migrants usually follow native fertility patterns and 
postpone family formation due to career goals. While family reunification and refugee 
migration have shown higher fertility levels and slower adaptation to lower childbearing 
patterns of the host country. The decision to build a family is likely to be delayed until migrants 
reunify with their family members or when they are able to assure a better future in the new 
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country (Murphy, 2016 p. 228; Simpson, 2017 p. 7; Stonawski et al., 2016 p. 553-554). Most 
studies have found that international migrant’s fertility behaviour declines to levels close to 
rates among native women over time, but also for intra-European female immigrants (Murphy, 
2016 p. 229) especially immigrants of the second and third generations (Keely, 2009 p. 397, 
399; Sobotka, 2008 p. 236). These studies on the relation between migration and fertility shed 
light on how immigrants affect total fertility rates yet only to a small extent. Also, migrants 
tend to assimilate to the low native fertility patterns in European countries.  
 
2.5 Determinants of migration  
There are plenty of dimensions to what influences immigration and emigration. Push and pull 
factors are familiar terms in the research field of migration. Incentives behind migration depend 
partly on the circumstances that drive individuals to leave their home countries (push) 
simultaneously with the characteristics of the destination country, which in turn attracts 
migrants (pull) (Simpson, 2017 p. 3). Attributes of the origin countries that stimulate people to 
emigration are poverty, low wages, unemployment, corruption, conflict/war, terrorism, 
insecurity/oppression and discrimination (Simpson, 2017 p. 3; the World Bank Group, 2006 p. 
78; Winter, 2019 p. 2-3). Well-known pull factors are e.g., expected wage differentials, strong 
economic growth, differences in GDP per capita between countries, immigration policy and 
immigrant network (Simpson, 2017 p. 3, 5; Winter, 2019 p. 18; the World Bank Group, 2006 
p. 75, 92). The literature also discusses how the welfare state acts as a pull factor and is often 
referred as “the welfare state hypothesis”. This implies that regions or countries attract 
immigration based on the generosity of the public transfer programs. The generosity is in turn 
referred to the share of social expenditures as percentages of GDP (Simpson, 2017 p. 5; Razin 
& Wahba, 2011 p. 28). One specific component for intra-European migration that can favour 
(also halt) migration is positive expectations for economic growth, which the candidacy and 
the membership of the EU often stimulate as the union work towards common sustainable 
economic goals (the World Bank Group, 2006 p. 91).  
Determinants of migration are often divided into groups as economic and demographic, 
political (macro-level), social and cultural (micro-level). Winter (2019) examined the 
economic and political determinants of immigration from both inside and outside the EU-28 
during 1998-2016. He claims that intra-European migration has mainly been driven by 
economic incentive rather than political whilst international migrants originating from outside 
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Europe are influenced both by economic and political incentives. He confirms that GDP per 
capita is substantially larger in destination countries than in countries of origin regardless of 
whether the migration is within or outside the EU (Winter, 2019 p. 18).  
Following Winter’s (2019) finding that GDP per capita is a robust determinant for migration 
rates in European states regardless of where the immigrants come from (Winter, 2019 p. 18) 
GDP per capita is included as a control variable in the current study. It is appropriate since the 
net migration rates used here do not distinguish between intra-European and international 
migration. The inclusion of GDP per capita is also necessary in order to avoid making false 
assumptions on how the focal relation between fertility and migration are associated. 
 
2.6 The welfare state and demographic structure 
This section will briefly highlight how the welfare state plays an important role regarding 
family formation and migration and thereby demographic structure.  
One of the two goals with increasing immigration expressed by the UN (2000) was to stabilize 
the share of people in working-age. Up to this point, we know that both higher fertility levels 
and increasing immigration can mitigate shrinking cohorts of people in working-age in 
European societies. McDonald & Kippen (2001) pointed out another component: women’s 
participation in the labour market. They prompted that higher fertility will contribute to 
demographic change in a medium-long term, while migration and women’s participation 
operate in the shorter run (McDonald & Kippen, 2001 p. 22). The participation of women in 
the labour market also plays an important role for family formation. European states are divided 
in the literature into different types of welfare regimes and act in various ways to support the 
unification of work and family life with e.g. flexible working hours, paid parental leave, state-
subsidised childcare and early education for children (McDonald, 2013 p. 992). McDonald 
(2013) explains the decreasing fertility levels in Europe as an outcome of the difficulties 
women have to balance work and family life, especially in urban areas in central, eastern and 
southern Europe. France and the Nordic countries’ higher levels of fertility are explained by 
supportive family policies and the Nordic countries’ gender egalitarianism has shown to 
encourage childbearing (McDonald, 2013 p. 991). Additionally, the welfare state can act as a 
pull factor to migration as mentioned in the section above (2.4). “The welfare magnet 
hypothesis” suggests that destination countries with helpful transfers might allure migrants’ by 
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the generosity of public assistance programs (Razin & Wahba, 2011 p. 29; Simpson, 2017 p. 
5). Taking the dissimilarities between the countries into consideration in terms of welfare 
systems this study will control and make comparisons between the groups of countries. 
Thereby, we get a more refined insight into how the welfare groups might mitigate the 
association between fertility and migration. 
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3. Research question and hypothesis  
This study aims to examine if and how net migration rate per capita is associated with total 
fertility rates. Both the UN and EU have suggested that increasing migrant inflows to EU 
countries might help deal with the European demographic crisis, i.e. ageing and shrinking 
population sizes. The consequences of the crisis are foreseen to challenge Europe’s position on 
the global stage both as an economic powerhouse and as a provider of welfare services, as a 
smaller tax base will struggle to provide for growing cohorts of elderly who will require public 
services.  
 
Research question 
 Are fertility and migration rates associated among 27 European states in the years 
1997 and 2017? 
 
 
 
Hypothesis  
 
H1: There is an association between total fertility rates and net migration rates per capita.  
H0: There is no association between total fertility rates and net migration rates per capita. 
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4. Method and Data  
The section of Method and Data discusses the choices of method and material. The selection 
of countries and years follows and furthermore operationalization of the dependent, 
independent and control variables. In the end, I illustrate models, brief the scientific premise 
and discuss further limitations. 
 
4.1 The choice of regression analyses  
I have chosen a quantitative method to grasp if and how fertility and migration levels correlate 
in European-level analyses due to the declining births the past decades. In order to examine 
whether fertility and migration rates associate I carry out a statistical design and make cross-
sectional analyses at two points of time, 1997 and 2017 with data from the World Bank. Cross-
sectional analyses capture data on relations at a certain point in time and will not tell us about 
changes over time nor are the coefficients comparable between the two years (Barmark & 
Djurfeldt, 2015 p. 42). I use linear regression analyses in which the independent variable is 
TFR and the dependent variable is net migration rate per capita, following Billari (2008 p.14) 
studies of replacement migration. In so doing, I aim to find to what extent fertility levels explain 
migration rates in two unexplored time periods within the research field. Linear regression 
analyses are chosen due to the continuous dependent variable, but also because all explanatory 
variables are either on ratio scale or dichotomous. Otherwise, I would have practised logistic 
regression analyses with an independent variable on a nominal or ordinal scale (Djurfeldt & 
Barmark, 2009 p.125). Linear regressions make it possible to examine the nature of 
associations (de Vaus, 2002 p. 279-280) and thus tell us if fertility and migration are associated 
and thereby reject the null hypothesis of no relationship. 
I include three control variables to lessen the risk of getting spurious results of the relationship 
between fertility and migration. Since migration is determined by multiple factors and TFR is 
a rather uncommon variable in this context of migration studies control variables are added to 
isolate the effect that fertility rates potentially have on migration rates. I present and discuss 
the choice of the control variable further below. 
It should be noted that the number of observations (n=27 each year) restricts the generalization 
of my findings. Previous research by Wilson et al., (2013) and Winter (2019) practised panel-
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data analyses that include more observations and makes it easier to draw conclusions out of the 
results. Panel-data or time-series analyses would have benefitted my analyses and tell us how 
fertility and migration rates associate over time, but is it both time consuming (Barmark & 
Djurfeldt, 2015 p. 42) and out of my academic knowledge. Nonetheless, I chose to run linear 
regression analyses as Billari (2008 p. 14) did between fertility and migration rates at a 
European-level.  
Another way to tackle this topic would have been to make a qualitative textual analysis and 
investigate commentaries from European politicians about higher immigration as a solution to 
ageing and shrinking population sizes. Nonetheless, it would have been difficult to collect 
material from politicians from different parties in all the 27 member states chosen here. 
Moreover, it would have not given us an understanding of how fertility and migration are 
statistically related, which this study aims to do. 
 
4.2 The World Bank database 
The data for net migration rate and population, TFR, and GDP per capita is drawn from the 
institution of global statistic the World Bank Open Data (https://data.worldbank.org/). This 
international institution of statistical data aims to provide high-quality data by supporting 
national statistical systems and make data comprehensive. The data derived both from official 
national statistics, in this case, European national statistic bureaus, and through their own 
publications where they adjust fiscal/calendar-year differences. The World Bank uses data 
often via Eurostat, which is the case for the total fertility rates here except for Cyprus, which 
data instead were collected from United Nations Population Prospects (the World Bank data, 
2017a). Eurostat’s demographic statistics is also one of the six sources behind data on total 
population8 (the World Bank data, 2019). An option would have been to use OECD, Eurostat 
or national statistics on migration rates, but Eurostat and OECD do not calculate net migration 
rate but keep immigration, emigration and refugee migration separate. Yearly data of GDP per 
capita derive also from the World Bank database in collaboration with OECD National 
Accounts data. Other options would have been to collect data from Maddison project, Penn 
                                                 
8 The other sources behind population data by the World Bank: (1) United Nations Population Division. World 
Population Prospects: 2019 Revision. (2) Census reports and other statistical publications from national statistical 
offices, (3) United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Report, (4) U.S. Census Bureau: 
International Database (the World Bank data, 2019)  
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World Table or the OECD database itself, but none of these institutions facilitates data of GDP 
per capita for all the chosen countries both years. Besides, the data by the World Bank database 
is accessible and comprehensive which fits my study of 27 countries very well. However, the 
institution work with aggregated data so the user has to be cautious when combining data due 
to differences in definitions, timing and reporting practices that can lead to inconsistencies. In 
order to increase the reliability of this study and consider the importance of intersubjective 
research (Esaiasson et al., 2017 p. 25, 64), I present a table of frequencies with data from the 
World Bank under Appendix 2.  
 
4.3 Selection of countries and years of analysis  
This study aims at focusing on the EU-28 member states. However, after running several 
analyses I omitted Luxembourg. The country is an outlier due to its high GDP per capita and 
sensitivity for net migration rates divided by its small population size, which affected the 
results 9 . The 27 selected countries here are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
The decision of the two years 1997 and 2017 10  is based on several aspects regarding 
fluctuations of migration rates rather than levels of TFR as the fertility levels in most EU 
countries have been below replacement levels in the past 20 years (World Bank, 2017a; 2017b). 
The two years, 1997 and 2017 capture two time periods before and after large-scale migration 
flows from outside but also within Europe. In the early 1990s borders broke down in the 
aftermath of the fall of the Iron curtain that caused large migration flows. In the 2010s the 
global financial crises that outburst during 2007-2008 (and later the euro crisis) led to a 
reduction of international immigration to Europe and changed intra-European migration 
streams11 (de la Rica et al., 2015 p. 1304, 1307). Later on, in 2015 the so-called refugee crisis 
                                                 
9 Appendix 3 and 4 present models including Luxembourg. GDP per capita correlated frequently positively with 
net migration rate per capita and caused one spurious results of the focal relation. 
10 My analyses of 1997 refer to lagged fertility levels from 1992 and migration stock between 1st of July 1995 - 
30th of June 2000. 2017 compute lagged fertility levels of 2012 and migration stock between 1st of July 2015- 
predicted rates until 30th of June 2020 (the World Bank data, 2017b).  
11 The traditional East-West intra-EU migration transformed to more South-North migration streams (de la Rica 
et al., 2015 p. 1307).  
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took place, which increased the international immigration flows to some European states 
immensely (Winter, 2019 p. 2). Besides, one important similarity between 1997 and 2017 is 
the characteristic of recovering from economic crises.  
World Bank data also contains five-year estimates of migration for 2002, 2007 and 2012. 
Previous studies have investigated migration from the beginning of the 2000s to a great extent 
due to Italy and Spain’s very high rates of immigration and very low levels of fertility (Billari, 
2008; Billari & Dalla-Zuanna, 2011). Therefore, I chose to examine a time period slightly 
earlier. I chose to leave 2007 and 2012 out due to the restrictions old member states 
implemented after the EU-enlargement in 2004 with 10 new member states mostly from 
Eastern Europe. Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004 western, southern and northern 
Europe countries feared from mass immigration from East. Most EU-15 countries implemented 
restrictions on the right to work for the new member state until 2007-2008, which in some cases 
were kept in place until 2014 (de la Rica et al., 2015 p. 1308-1309). Based on these migration 
restrictions that limit the movement of people I decided to examine 2017, which also is the 
latest data from the World Bank on net migration rates. 
 
4.4 Operationalization of variables  
The following section describes first the dependent and independent variables and then the 
control variables.  
4.4.1 Net migration rate per capita  
To operationalize the dependent variable, net migration rate per capita, I divided the net 
migration rate by the total population size of each country each year in order to match the other 
variables (TFR is divided by women in cohorts and GDP per capita by citizens). Migration is 
the demographic pillar that is most unstable because a person can migrate multiple times, in 
comparison to fertility and mortality. In addition, countries’ have different definitions of 
various types of migrants (Ediev, Coleman & Scherbov, 2014 p. 624). The data for net 
migration rate include migration stock rather than flows. Stocks are the number of migrants 
within a country or region at a certain point of time, while flows are the numbers crossing a 
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boarder during a time period (Eurostat, 2003)12. The World Bank (2017b) subtracts immigrants 
with emigrants, includes both citizens and non-citizens within a five-year period (World Bank, 
2017b). Consequently, the measurements are the total sum of migration stock for 1995-2000 
and 2015-2020. An alternative would have been to make average measurements by dividing 
the total net migrations rate by 5 years and thereby get annual migration stocks, but the 
reliability would be questionably as the quantities would not have been entirely correct.  
Total population estimates are based on national population censuses and summarize data for 
demographic structure and changes in mortality, fertility and migration. The definition of 
population is ‘all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship’. The values here are 
midyear estimates and one limitation is that of national statistics offices’ different ways of 
collecting and defining population data (the World Bank data, 2019). To exemplify my 
operationalization in the case of Germany, the migration stock for 1997 (1995-2000) is 695914 
and divided by a population size of 82 million the net migration rate per capita equals 0,8 
percent. In the regressions the 1-unit step for net migration rate per capita is 0,025 in 1997 and 
0,020 in 2017.  
 
4.4.2 Total Fertility Rate  
The values for the independent variable Total Fertility Rate (TFR) refer to births per woman 
during her reproductive years (mostly between 15 and 49), and have two dimensions: the 
number of births within an age-specific group, and the number of women in different cohorts. 
This implies that TFR might in certain cases decrease due to an increase in the mother's cohort 
without any practical change in the number of births. The postponement of births among 
European women also causes tempo-effects in TFR, which can lead to very low levels 
statistically for one year, but will be even out in the future when these older women in their 
reproductive years decide to have children (van Nimwegen & van der Erf, 2010 p. 1363). A 
crucial part is to take the effect of time into account, therefore the variable TFR is lagged by 5 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that data on immigration flows from the World Bank could have been a better measurement 
of migration levels. However, flows are more fluent, while stocks is a more reliable measurement of how many 
migrants that actually have settled down in the source country. An alternative would have been to compile a 
dataset myself from Eurostat and the World Bank to assure international and intra-European migration flows. I 
decided however that the best alternative is to use the net migration rate from World Bank of migration stock 
divided by the size of the population. 
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year in average. For instance, the analyses for 1997 constitute the TFR in 1992 and the total 
average of net migration rate per capita 1995-2000. It is implausible that European countries 
will suddenly raise their net migration rates because of lower birth trends the year after. 3 to 8-
year intervals are a rather short time for states to change migration or family policies. However, 
by the time this study begins European countries were well aware of their low fertility levels 
that had decreased since the 1970s before UN (2000) and the EU Commission (2006) published 
their reports.  
This study will investigate whether the alarming low fertility levels have had an impact on net 
migration rate per capita among twenty-seven European countries. In this regard, TFR is 
appropriate since it is comparable and a traditional measurement for fertility (Ediev et al., 2014 
p. 623). If this study intended to make a demographic prognosis, examine replacement 
migration, or to check impacts for different groups of the population then TFR would have 
been needed more elaboration. In the regressions, the 1-unit step for the predictor variable TFR 
is 0,25 in 1997 and 0,2 in 2017. 
 
4.4.3 GDP per capita  
The multiple regression analyses will control for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 
US dollars. Winter’s (2019) findings clearly showed how gaps in GDP per capita determine 
migration regardless immigration to the EU member states from countries within or outside of 
EU (Winter, 2019 p.18) making the use of GDP per capita important as a control variable for 
net migration rate that does not separate the origin of migrants. GDP per capita is reduced here 
by 1000, divided by the midyear population and comprises the sum of a country’s total gross 
value of goods and services produced annually. The GDP per capita is based on nominal GDP, 
which do not make deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets. Neither for depletion nor 
degradation of natural resources which real GDP does (the World Bank 2017c). GDP per capita 
is sometimes criticized for being unstable measurement, especially when comparing countries 
since it is uncertain what counts as products and services. Also, GDP is often criticized for 
giving robust results for living standard in comparison to Human Development Index (HDI). 
Instead GDP should simply be seen as a statistical measurement for economic development 
comparing the growth over time (Sandelin, 2014 p. 69, 93, 95). Winter (2019) discusses 
differentials in GDP per capita between destination and sending countries as worse or better 
economic conditions. This being said, for the current study GDP per capita is appropriate as it 
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is being used as a proxy for economic development level. The 1-unit step in the analyses is 
20,00 for 1997 and 2017 (20 000 US Dollars). 
 
4.4.4 EU-membership  
The impact of EU membership on migration rates is pivotal to consider here due to the selection 
of countries and years. In 1997 only fifteen states were members out of the twenty-eight 
member states in 2017. The EU-enlargement in 2004 set off a whole new basis for intra-EU 
migration flows with ten new member states, mostly new democracies and post-communistic 
states from the former Soviet Union. After 2007 Bulgaria and Romania also accessed the union 
and thereby the European market (de la Rica et al., 2015 p. 1304, 1307). During the last twenty 
years, migration streams from Eastern to Western Europe among EU member states have been 
shaped mainly by economic determinants as unemployment and GDP differentials (Winter, 
2019 p. 35). What we know in addition is that, that the candidacy and EU participation may 
impact migratory flows in terms of prospects of economic growth and work opportunities (the 
World Bank Group, 2006 p. 91). Hence, EU membership will be controlled as a dummy 
variable for 1997 and not later in 2017 because all countries were member states at that time. 
EU-membership is used as a dummy variable in Table 5.2. Membership has the value of 1 and 
non-membership equals 0. Figure 4.1 elucidates the member and non-member states of the EU.  
 
Figure 4.1 Non-member and member states of the EU  
Year Member states of the EU  
1997  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
(Luxembourg), the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. EU-
15 
2017  EU-15 + Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Romania  
EU-28  
(European Union, 2019)  
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4.4.5 Welfare state regime type  
The final control variable is the categorical variable welfare state regime type that I coded to 
dummies. With the inclusion of welfare state regime type we are able to make a comparison 
between the groups of countries. Both migration and social policies are areas of legislation on 
a national level within the EU and type of welfare state is therefore included in the study to 
give us a more disaggregated insight of whether fertility and migration associate related to that 
of an aggregated European-level.  
The typology used here is inspired by three scientific publications. Firstly, the archetypical 
publication of three types of welfare regimes by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) after the post-war 
era in 18 OECD countries based on the level of decommodification13 and stratification14. 
Secondly, Ferrera’s (1996) study which extents the former categorizing by including a southern 
regime type dedicated to countries in the southern Europe as one separate group. Therefore, 
Italy belongs to Ferrara’s “southern regimes” and not to Esping-Andersen’s “conservative 
regimes”. Thirdly, Orenstein & Hass (2005) distinguish post-communist welfare regimes 
between Euro-Asian and European. The European post-communist welfare regimes were used 
here and fits the study very well since the group of European post-communist welfare states 
includes the Baltic countries, east-central European countries and former Yugoslav republics. 
Therefore I use the following categorization:  
 
Figure 4.2 Welfare state regime types 
Welfare state regime type  Countries  
Social democratic (3) Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
Liberal (2) Ireland and the United Kingdom 
Conservative (5 used here)  Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, (Luxembourg) and the Netherlands 
Southern (6) Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain.  
Post – Communist (11) Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  
Esping-Andersen (1990); Ferrera (1996); Orenstein & Hass (2005) 
                                                 
13 Decommodification: Whether services irrespective of a job or not are provided for citizens mostly by the state 
as in social democratic regimes, by the market as in liberal regimes or family as in the conservative regimes. 
14 Stratification: the extent of the inequality of the society as an effect of how the welfare is organised (Berg & 
Spehar, 2011 p.65).  
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The Nordic countries make up the group of social-democratic regimes where 
decommodification and stratification are mostly provided by the state. Therefore, I chose 
social-democratic regimes as reference category because I assume these countries have rather 
high levels of social spending as percentages of GDP as a total group and fit the pull factor 
“welfare state hypothesis”, which implies how the generosity of welfare expenditures attracts 
immigrants (Razin & Wahba, 2011 p. 29; Simpson, 2017 p. 5). 
 
 
4.5 Causal models 15 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 This study cannot claim the causality between the variables, therefore are the arrows in both ways. 
TFR 
Independent variable 
Net migration 
rate per capita 
Dependent variable 
Net migration rate 
per capita 
TFR 
 
GDP per capita 
Control variable 
TFR 
EU membership 
Control variable 
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4.6 Scientific premise  
This study has the aim of empirically describe how fertility and migration rate associate in 
contrast to explain. With this in mind, the reasons behind the results will be carefully 
interpreted by using explanations from the previous research. This study has a deductive 
approach with a presupposed hypothesis and investigates if the null hypothesis can be rejected 
or not (Bryman, 2016 p. 47; Esaiasson et al., 2017). 
 
4.7 Discussion of Limitations  
There are several limitations regarding my research on fertility and migration. The use of net 
migration rate might be problematic as it does not take into account the different types of 
migration: labour migrants, family reunification, asylum seekers, or irregular migration nor 
consider, international vs. intra-European migration (Spehar & Berg, 2011 p. 206). I could have 
improved my study by using rates of labour migration, however, the statistical office of the 
European Community (Eurostat) does not contain this data, so I decided to run regressions with 
net migration rate. Labour migrants would be more appropriate to address the aspect of smaller 
cohorts in working-age. Besides these aspects of the validity of this study, I attach a table of 
frequencies in Appendix 2 to be transparent and thereby produce good reliability. In addition, 
my study does not control for migration policies, which naturally impact migration flows to a 
great extent. Winter (2019) mentions the lack of comparative studies of migration policies and 
did not include it himself. Migration policies vary significantly within the EU, and no 
comprehensive index of migration policies is at hand.16 Finally, the comparison of welfare state 
regime types makes the samples very small and uneven. For example, the eastern post-
communist regimes are 11 and the social-democratic only 3. I decided however not to group 
regime types because they differ substantially and because I wanted to avoid producing biased 
results. 
                                                 
16 The International Migration Policy of Law Analysis (IMPALA) work at the moment on data which can 
compensate the differences to make it possible to compare migrant groups in the shortcoming future (Winter, 
2019 p. 34). 
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5. Results 
The results section presents two analyses separately for the years 1997 and 2017. The first table 
includes five models for 1997 in table 5.2, whilst there are three models for 2017 in table 5.3 
because EU membership cannot be controlled for. The tables include first simple regression 
analysis for the association between (lagged) TFR and net migration rate per capita, then 
multiple regression analyses are presented in which I control for GDP per capita, EU 
membership (only in 1997) and type of welfare state regime. Before we look at the simple and 
multiple regression analyses I present descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 presents the mean values, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the 
variables on ratio scale. The dependent variable net migration rate per capita, the independent 
variable TFR and one of the control variables GDP per capita.  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics: Lagged Fertility, GDP per capita and net migration per capita.   
Source: the World Bank Data 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2019.  
Observed data: 54 (N) 
* GDP per capita reduced by 3 decimals 
 
 
Univariate statistics N Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
  1997 
Lagged TFR 27 1,698 0,274 1,29 2,34 
GDP per capita* 27 14,778 10,430 1,35 32,84 
Net migration rate per capita 27 0,004 0,019 -0,041 0,059 
  2017 
Lagged TFR 27 1,558 0,222 1,28 2,01 
GDP per capita* 27 30,075 16,273 8,03 69,33 
Net migration rate per capita 27 0,004 0,010 -0,025 0,022 
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Table 5.1 presents the central tendency and dispersion of the variables using the mean and 
standard deviation for the 27 countries. The mean value of lagged TFR is on average higher in 
1997 reaching almost 1.7 births per woman, relative to 1.56 in 2017. The averages show the 
trend of “below replacement” in Europe as the literature discusses (Baird et al., 2010 p. 592; 
Billari, 2008 p. 2; Lutz & Skirbekk, 2005 p. 699). The variation of lagged TFR decreases from 
1997 to 2017, which can be seen by looking at the minimum and maximum values and the size 
of the standard deviation. The min-values are nearly the same, while the max-value has 
decreased which is a sign of convergence between the states in terms of childbearing patterns. 
In 1997 Germany had the lowest TFR (1,29) and Cyprus the highest (2,34), while in 2017 
Portugal had the lowest levels of fertility (1,28) and France had the highest (2,01)17.  
The mean levels of economic development as measured by GDP per capita in US dollars have 
increased from 14,7 in 1997 to 30,0 in 2017 among the countries. The dispersion is narrower 
in 1997 than to that in 2017 when the difference between rich and poor countries were bigger. 
Bulgaria had the lowest level of development in both years, Denmark the highest GDP per 
capita 1997 and Ireland had the highest level among the countries in 201718.  
The mean values for net migration rates per capita are the same for both years. In other words, 
the migrant stock constitutes 0,4 percent of the total population size of the 27 countries and it 
signals that the five-year estimated migrant stock has followed the size of the total population 
after many eminent migration streams in Europe looking at the values in 1997 and in 2017. 
The dispersion of net migration rate per capita in 1997 shows how countries’ values deviate 
more from the average than in 2017. The states’ net migration rate per capita differed more 
from each other in 1997 in terms of minimum and maximum values with Croatia’s high 
emigration rate (-4,1 percent) and Cyprus’s high immigration rate (5,9 percent). In 2017 Latvia 
the highest levels of emigration (-2,5 percent) while Germany had the highest share of 
immigrants relative to its population (2,2 percent)19 20.   
 
                                                 
17 Descriptive statistics including Luxemburg do not differ for the lagged TFR variable.  
18 Luxembourg pushed the statistics a lot for both years. For example, Luxembourg’s GDP per capita 2017 was 
104,10 compare to the second-highest (Ireland) rate of 69,33.  
19 Luxembourg had the highest net migration per capita in 2017 of 4,1 percent.  
20 In 1997 eight countries experienced net emigration rates and nineteen countries net immigration rates. The 
division of countries is the same in 2017 however Portugal turned to emigration country and the Slovak Republic 
from emigration to immigration country instead. See Appendix 2.  
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5.2 Fertility and migration rates 1997  
Table 5.2 presents five models with b-coefficients, the constant, R2 and adjusted R2. Due to 
the very small sample of 27 observations the level of significance is 0,1. Nevertheless, P-values 
of 0,005 and 0,001 are also presented because some results these levels of significance. 
Adjusted R2 will be interpreted as the degree of explanation to net migration rate per capita 
instead of analysing the R2 value as a further consequence of the small sample (Barmark & 
Djurfeldt, 2015 p. 142). 
 
Table 5.2 Model Summary and Coefficients: Multiple regression analyses year 1997. Dependent 
variable: Net migration rate per capita 
Source: own estimates from the World Bank Data 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2019. 
N = 27  
Significance levels: * = p <0,1 ** = p <0.05 *** = p <0.01  
Standard error of coefficients in brackets  
 
                                                 
21 The variable is coded 0= non-members state, 1 = member state. 
Regression analyses Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Lagged TFR 0,019 
(0,014) 
0,020 
(0,012) 
0,028* 
(0,014) 
0,029 ** 
(0,011) 
0,027  
(0,16) 
GDP per capita  0,001** 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,001) 
0,002 
(0,001) 
0,001  
(0,001) 
EU membership21   0,017 
(0,016) 
 -0,003  
(0,018) 
Welfare state regime 
(social democratic as ref.cat) 
     
Liberal    0,014 
(0,013) 
0,014  
(0,013) 
Conservative    0,014  
(0,11) 
0,014  
(0,012) 
Southern    0,046 ** 
(0,019) 
0,044 * 
(0,021) 
Post-Communist    0,024  
(0,027) 
0,020 
(0,035) 
Constant   -0,027 -0,041 -0,053 -0,090 -0,083 
𝐑𝟐  0,068 0,276 0,311 0,664 0,715 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 0,030 0,215 0,221 0,563 0,615 
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In model 1 we can see that TFR has a positive effect on net migration rate per capita. However, 
the coefficient is not significant and the adjusted R2 is very low: 3 percent. That indicates that 
TFR does not associate alone with net migration per capita. In the next model GDP per capita 
is added as a control variable and it shows a very small positive significant correlation. 
However, it increases the adjusted R2 up to 21,5 percent, which signals that the GDP per capita 
is one determinant to migration rates in European states as the literature discusses. Yet, the 
coefficient for TFR is not significant in model 2.  
In model 3 we add EU membership as another control variable. The coefficient has a positive 
value, which indicates that the EU member states in 1997 associate with higher levels of net 
migration rate in comparison to the other European countries however it is not significant. GDP 
per capita turns insignificant and has the value of zero when adding EU membership. It is most 
likely due to the fact that the division of EU member states and non-members are on the one 
hand similar to the division of countries into high and low economic development and take out 
the effect in model 3. On the other hand, the variation gets even smaller causing the 
insignificance for GDP per capita. However, by adding EU membership the positive coefficient 
for TFR becomes significant on a level of 90 percent and the total model has a degree of 
explanation of just above 22 percent.  
In model 4 the variable for EU membership is excluded and the type of welfare state regime 
added. The level of significant increases for TFR from 90 percent to 95 percent and the 
coefficient is slightly more positive. GDP per capita remains insignificant and the model has 
an adjusted R2 value of 56 percent. Of all welfare state regime types, only southern regimes 
are significant on a level of 95 percent in a positive correlation. By this, we can simply see 
higher levels of migration per capita in southern regimes relative to the social-democratic 
states. The other groups of welfare state regimes turns insignificant, but we can however see 
that the groups do not differ to a great extent in terms of their migration levels from the social-
democratic countries. These findings of positive associations in Model 3 and 4 is a result of 
Malta and Cyprus’s strong effect in the analysis. When excluding the two countries there are 
in fact no associations between (lagged) TFR and net migration rate per capita in 1997. Both 
countries belong also to the southern regime types and lead to significant results of higher net 
migration rate per capita relative to the social-democratic regime type in Table 5.2. However, 
once we exclude the two countries the positive associations turn insignificant (see Appendix 
5). 
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Finally, in model 5 both EU membership and welfare state regime type are included. Yet, only 
the coefficient for southern regimes is significant, which implies simply that southern regimes 
have the highest net migration rate per capita among the groups of countries. The adjusted R2 
for the model is 61,5 percent. The insignificant TFR in model 5, also model 1 and 2, tell us that 
fertility and migration do not associate in 1997 once controlling for GDP per capita, EU 
membership and type of welfare state regime, which means that other factors are shaping 
migration rates in Europe such as differences in GDP per capita as model 2 confirms.   
Three out of five models in 1997 led to insignificant results of the focal relationship and that 
lead us to adopt the null hypothesis. Model 3 and 4 carry out statistical significant positive 
association between lagged fertility and net migration rate per capita nevertheless and hereby 
I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no association between fertility and migration rates. 
However, when omitting Malta and Cyprus there is no statistical significant association 
amongst the other twenty-five European countries (see Appendix 5).    
 
5.3 Fertility and migration rates 2017  
Table 5.3 presents three models with b-coefficients, the constant, R2 and adjusted R2. As stated 
before, the level of significance is 0,1 and the adjusted R2 value explains the variation of net 
migration rates per capita due to the small number of observations  (Barmark & Djurfeldt, 2015 
p. 142).  
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Table 5.3 Model Summary and Coefficients: Multiple regression analyses year 2017. Dependent 
variable: Net migration rate per capita 
Source: own estimates from the World Bank Data 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2019. 
N = 27 
Significance levels: * = p <0,1 ** = p <0.05 *** = p <0.01  
Standard error of coefficients in brackets 
Model 6 implies a positive correlation between TFR and net migration rate per capita in 2017, 
but it is not significant. The degree of variation is however very small, 2,8 percent which 
indicate that other factors impact migration in Europe rather than fertility levels. The 
coefficient for lagged TFR is in addition insignificant.  In model 7 we can see how the 
coefficients for lagged TFR turn from positive to negative, which demonstrates the fragility of 
the statistical association. The association between GDP per capita and net migration rate per 
capita is significant with a level of 99 percent size and the effect is modest. TFR and GDP per 
capita explain together 35 percent of the variance in net migration rate per capita here and that 
is mainly due to the explanation of economic development levels on migration rates rather than 
fertility levels.  
When adding all variables lagged TFR, GDP per capita and welfare state regime type together 
as seen in model 8 none of the coefficients remain significant. TFR is negative and insignificant 
and the effect of controlling for GDP per capita has also become insignificant. That is a result 
of how the division of welfare state regimes lessens the variation between the countries in terms 
of economic development and the sample decreases to, for example, only 2 in the case of liberal 
Regression analyses Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 2017 2017 2017 
Lagged TFR 0,012  
(0,009) 
-0,014  
(0,011) 
-0,010  
(0,014) 
GDP per capita  0,001***  
(0,000) 
0,000  
(0,000) 
Welfare state regime 
(social-democratic as ref.cat) 
   
Liberal   -0,001  
(0,008) 
Conservative   0,001  
(0,007) 
Southern   -0,005  
(0,012) 
Post-Communist   -0,014 
(0,013) 
Constant   -0,015 0,010 0,022 
𝐑𝟐  0,065 0,400 0,498 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 0,028 0,350 0,347 
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regimes. Values of the groups of welfare state show how social-democratic regimes had higher 
migration rate than to liberal, southern and post-communistic regimes, with the exception of 
conservative regimes that instead had higher levels. The adjusted R2 is slightly lower, 34,7 
percent, than model 7 that excludes welfare state regime type (35,0 percent). The welfare state 
as a control variable split in to group of countries does not help us explain migration rates in 
Europe in the year 2017. In conclusion, all the insignificant results in Table 5.3 lead us to adopt 
the null hypothesis. In other words, there is no association between fertility and migration in 
my study of 2017.  
 
5.4 Summary of results  
The main finding of this study is that of the majority of insignificant results over the focal 
relationship between fertility levels and net migration stock as percentages of the total 
population sizes among 27 European states both in 1997 and 2017. Nevertheless, lagged TFR 
and net migration rate per capita associate positively in 1997 when controlling for GDP per 
capita and the division of non-members and members of the EU. Together they explained 22 
percent of the variation in net migration rate per capita among the EU countries. Lagged TFR 
and net migration rate correlated again positively when adding GDP per capita, and type of 
welfare state regime and explained 56 percent of the net migration rates per capita. We can also 
see how the six countries in South Europe had higher level of net migration rate per capita in 
1997 relative to three Social Democratic states. In other words, countries with higher fertility 
levels showed to have a higher net migration rate per capita in two of the models of 1997, but 
the inclusion of all variables in 1997 shows how the positive association of fertility and 
migration partly is spurious, but mostly a result of Cyprus and Malta’s strong influences in the 
analyses (see Appendix 5). In 2017 all regressions were insignificant except from the result of 
a small positive correlation between GDP per capita and net migration rate per capita. All other 
findings of insignificant results reveal to us that fertility and migration do not associate in this 
current study. 
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6. Conclusion and Discussion  
The purpose of this study was to understand whether fertility levels and migration rates 
associate due to suggestions for rising immigration based on the concerns about the emergence 
of very low fertility in European states. The research question and hypothesis were: 
“Are fertility and migration rates associated among 27 European states in the years 1997 and 
2017?” 
 
H1: There is an association between total fertility rates and net migration rates per capita.  
H0: There is no association between total fertility rates and net migration rates per capita. 
Using linear regression analysis we are able to answer the question. The major pattern of my 
results is that of no association in 1997 and 2017 between total fertility rates (TFR) and net 
migration rates per capita. The only two cases in which the TFR had a significant association 
with net migration rates per capita were in 1997. In these two cases, contrary to Billari’s (2008) 
findings my models illustrate that higher levels of fertility are associate with higher levels of 
migration. The study of Billari (2008) found that countries with the lowest fertility levels 
between cohorts experienced higher rates of net migration later on (Billari, 2008 p.14). My 
finding of positive associations do not replicate the study of Billari & Dalla-Zuanna’s (2011) 
of birth-cohort replacement in country-specific cases, nor the study by Wilson et al. (2013) 
because of great dissimilarity of our operationalization of fertility and the type of methods used. 
To understand my uncommon results of positive associations we have to consider several 
authors. Wilson et al.’s (2013) study on population replacement that measuring countries 
separately finds that while France and Sweden had levels of migration that replaced “missing” 
births in younger cohorts over time, Bulgaria and Latvia did not have enough immigration to 
compensate the population decline in younger cohorts. Moreover, McDonald (2013) discusses 
how France and Sweden favour childbearing in terms of the encouragement of women in the 
labour market. Thereby we can suspect higher fertility levels in western and northern countries 
compare to eastern European countries. At the same time, we can assume higher migration 
rates in western and northern countries in 1997 firstly because of the East-West migration flows 
in Europe after the end of the Cold War (de la Rica, 2019 p. 1307). Secondly, by taking “the 
welfare state hypothesis” (Razin & Wahba 2011) into account established welfare systems in 
North, West and South of Europe could presumably work as a motive for the higher migration 
levels here in comparison to the newly democratized states in East. However, there is no 
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empirical evidence in the literature for positive correlations when it comes to fertility and 
migration rates on a European-level. I can therefore not establish my findings but rather 
speculate.  
The explanation of the positive associations between fertility and migration rate in 1997 is that 
of how specific countries affect these findings. The models are impacted strongly by Cyprus 
and Malta’s high levels of lagged TFR (from 1992) together with high net migration rates per 
capita because of their small population sizes and high immigration due to their locations in 
the Mediterranean Sea. Billari (2008) did not include Malta and Cyprus but chose to measure 
the largest 21 European states in 2008 probably due to the smaller countries differences in 
fertility and migration than to the rest of the European states. This implies that the positive 
associations here should not be interpreted as a general finding of how fertility and migration 
associate in a European perspective, but rather a result of Cyprus and Malta’s strong effects in 
the analyses. Once we take out Malta and Cyprus no associations appear between (lagged) TFR 
and net migration rate per capita in any model for 1997 (See Appendix 5).  
As stated, the major finding is though that fertility levels do not affect migration rates. This 
suggests that other factors are instead shaping migration to European states, for example, the 
pull factors immigration policy, the welfare state and wage differentials among others, but also 
push factors like poverty, discrimination and unemployment (Razin & Wahba, 2011; Simpson, 
2017; the World Bank Group 2006; Winter, 2019).  
In fact, in my study two variables are related to the literature on pull and push factor. The first 
is differences in GDP per capita, which suggests that higher levels of economic development 
associate with higher migration rates (Simpson, 2017; Winter 2019; the World Bank Group 
2006). In my models of GDP per capita and lagged TFR show a significant positive effect of 
GDP on migration levels both in 1997 and 2017. However, GDP per capita turns insignificant 
when including EU membership and welfare state regime type due to reduced variation in terms 
of GDP by EU membership and type of welfare state. The division of countries between non-
members and members, and countries’ levels of low or high economic development, are similar 
to each other and are therefore taking out the effect of each other. The welfare groups contain 
samples either of two, five, six or eleven countries compared with the social-democratic 
regimes of three countries, which lead to insignificant results of GDP per capita in the 
regression analyses.  
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The last finding and which is related to push factors is that of the six countries belonging to the 
southern welfare state regime type that had higher net migration rate per capita relative to the 
social-democratic regimes in 1997. This result corresponds to some degree with the push 
factors because of the geographical position of southern regimes with close borders to the 
African and Asian continents. It goes also in line with the previous discussions about high 
immigration flows to Italy and Spain around the 2000s by Billari (2008), Billari & Dalla-
Zuanna (2011) and Wilson et al., (2013). Besides, Malta and Cyprus belong to the southern 
regimes and make us again consider the countries’ impact in the analysis and the fact that no 
significant results appear for the types of welfare state when excluding the two countries (see 
Appendix 5).  
Studies on migration and fertility levels often examine to what extent migration impact fertility 
levels since immigration naturally impacts the population size in destination countries as 
Sobotka (2008) and Stonawaski et al. (2016) present. Since I cannot claim the causality 
between fertility and migration my results can also be understood as if higher net immigration 
associate with higher levels of fertility. However, the study tried to address the causality to 
some extent using lagged fertility levels of five years. That means that the higher fertility levels 
in 1992 are associating with higher levels of migration rates for 1997 when including Malta 
and Cyprus (see Table 5.2). Besides, I decided to have migration as response variable as Billari 
(2008) even though the main line in previous literature do not mention fertility levels as an 
incentive of migration.  
There are several reasons behind the majority of insignificant results in this study to discuss. 
One aspect is the very small number of 27 countries each year in the cross-sectional analyses 
and the observations get even fewer samples when grouping them into welfare regime types. 
In turn, this makes it difficult to generalize the results. Other quantitative studies on migration 
often examine trends over time and get thereby more observations. It is also more common to 
study fertility and migration at country or regional-levels contrary to the European level here 
and the variable of fertility is also often more elaborated than simply using total fertility rates 
(TFR).   
Another aspect behind insignificant results is that the three control variables are few in terms 
of motives for migration. We cannot tell that these control variables do statistically associate 
with both total fertility rates and net migration rate per capita in previous research, which 
explain why the literature on migration and fertility, in general, is divided by studies on either 
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replacement migration, migrants’ impact on fertility or determinants of migration. My study 
does also exclude many known determinants of migration that could have benefitted our 
knowledge of how fertility might affect migration, for instance, immigration policy. However, 
we can also interpret my main finding as if these two pillars of demographic structure actually 
do not associate because states are not willing to increase immigration as a solution to low 
fertility levels as the critics Espenshade (2001) and Keely (2009) discussed.  
I see how this study can evolve in many ways and will hereby propose ideas for further 
research. Today with documented data from the World Bank database it would be possible to 
renew Billari’s (2008) study with the latest data of net migration rate from 2017 on the decrease 
of births between the cohorts in 1977 and 1997. In order to grasp a better understanding of the 
“welfare state hypothesis” and migration social expenditure as a percentage of the GDP could 
have been included. Another idea is to make panel-data analyses over the years 1997-2017 
among these EU member states. That would resemble Winter’s (2019) study where he claimed 
GDP per capita for being a determinant of international and intra-European migration to the 
EU-28 countries 1998-2016. By doing so I could examine if fertility levels can explain 
migration rates together with all the variables he used. It would also be interesting to study 
comprehensive data on migration policy from IMPALA in the shortcoming future and labour 
migration from Eurostat to expand the research field on migration within a European 
demographic context.  
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Appendix 1 
Figure 1: Demographic pyramid 2016 and 2080 - The population of EU  
 
Source: (Eurostat, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2  
Table 1:  Tables of Frequencies  
Average values for Total Fertility Rate (TFR), Lagged TFR, Net migration rate, Total 
population, Net migration rate per capita, GDP per capita and Welfare state regime types.   
Country Year TFR Lagged 
TFR 
Net 
migration 
rate 
Population  Net 
migration 
rate per 
capita 
GDP 
per 
capita * 
Regime type 
Austria 1992 1,51 
 
227841 7840709  24,88 Conservative 
Austria 1997 1,39 1,51 65082 7968041 ,0081679 26,71 Conservative 
Austria 2017 
 
1,44 99999 8797566 ,0113667 47,29 Conservative 
Belgium 1992 1,65 
 
106947 10045158  23,50 Conservative 
Belgium 1997 1,60 1,65 50870 10181245 ,0049964 25,03 Conservative 
Belgium 2017 
 
1,79 240000 11375158 ,0210986 43,32 Conservative 
Bulgaria 1992 1,55 
 
-356464 8540164  1,21 PostComm 
Bulgaria 1997 1,09 1,55 -133824 8312068 -,0161000 1,35 PostComm 
Bulgaria 2017 
 
1,50 -24001 7075947 -,0033919 8,03 PostComm 
Croatia 1992 1,48 
 
-143579 4575818  
 
PostComm 
Croatia 1997 1,69 1,48 -188129 4534920 -,0414845 5,21 PostComm 
Croatia 2017 
 
1,51 -40000 4124531 -,0096981 13,29 PostComm 
Cyprus 1992 2,34 
 
43195 800611  11,31 Southern 
Cyprus 1997 1,95 2,34 53260 891190 ,0597628 14,30 Southern 
Cyprus 2017 
 
1,39 25001 1179680 ,0211930 25,23 Southern 
CzechRep 1992 1,71 
 
29999 10319123  3,35 PostComm 
CzechRep 1997 1,17 1,71 46002 10304131 ,0044644 6,00 PostComm 
CzechRep 2017 
 
1,45 59997 10594438 ,0056631 20,37 PostComm 
Denmark 1992 1,76 
 
65466 5171370  29,57 SocialDemo 
Denmark 1997 1,75 1,76 74568 5284991 ,0141094 32,84 SocialDemo 
Denmark 2017 
 
1,73 75998 5764980 ,0131827 56,31 SocialDemo 
Estonia 1992 1,71 
 
-111876 1533091  
 
PostComm 
Estonia 1997 1,32 1,71 -1197 1399535 -,0008553 3,62 PostComm 
Estonia 2017 
 
1,56 -4999 1317384 -,0037946 19,70 PostComm 
Finland 1992 1,85 
 
47223 5041992  22,34 SocialDemo 
Finland 1997 1,75 1,85 22154 5139835 ,0043103 24,68 SocialDemo 
Finland 2017 
 
1,80 70000 5508214 ,0012708 45,70 SocialDemo 
France 1992 1,74 
 
303416 58851217  23,81 Conservative 
France 1997 1,77 1,74 382333 59964851 ,0063760 24,23 Conservative 
France 2017 
 
2,01 400002 66865144 ,0059822 38,48 Conservative 
Germany 1992 1,29 
 
2659698 80624598  26,33 Conservative 
Germany 1997 1,35 1,29 695914 82034771 ,0084832 27,05 Conservative 
Germany 2017 
 
1,41 1850000 82657002 ,0223817 44,47 Conservative 
Greece 1992 1,36 
 
464636 10399061  11,18 Southern 
Greece 1997 1,27 1,36 297431 10661259 ,0278983 13,43 Southern 
Greece 2017 
 
1,34 49996 10754679 ,0046488 18,61 Southern 
Hungary 1992 1,77 
 
99980 10369341  3,73 PostComm 
Hungary 1997 1,37 1,77 78562 10290486 ,0076344 4,60 PostComm 
Hungary 2017 
 
1,34 29999 9787966 ,0030649 14,22 PostComm 
  
*GDP per capita reduced by 1000.  
Source: World Bank data (2017a); World Bank data (2017b); World Bank data (2017c); World Bank 
data (2019); Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrera (1996); Orenstein & Hass (2005).  
 
Ireland 1992 1,99  -10648 3558430  15,73 Liberal 
Ireland 1997 1,93 1,99 83412 3674171 ,0227023 22,54 Liberal 
Ireland 2017  2,00 23497 4807388 ,0048877 69,33 Liberal 
Italy 1992 1,30 
 
152825 56797087  23,17 Southern 
Italy 1997 1,21 1,30 223974 56890372 ,0039369 21,78 Southern 
Italy 2017 
 
1,43 350000 60536709 ,0057816 31,95 Southern 
Latvia 1992 1,73 
 
-116474 2614338  
 
PostComm 
Latvia 1997 1,11 1,73 -46601 2432851 -,0191549 2,68 PostComm 
Latvia 2017 
 
1,44 -50000 1942248 -,0257434 15,59 PostComm 
Lithuania 1992 1,97 
 
-100301 3700114  
 
PostComm 
Lithuania 1997 1,47 1,97 -93925 3575137 -,0262717 2,83 PostComm 
Lithuania 2017 
 
1,60 -25000 2828403 -,0088389 16,68 PostComm 
Luxembourg 1992 1,64 
 
20040 392175  40,97 Conservative 
Luxembourg 1997 1,71 1,64 19940 419450 ,0475384 47,04 Conservative 
Luxembourg 2017 
 
1,57 25001 596336 ,0419244 104,10 Conservative 
Malta 1992 2,11 
 
3787 367618  8,22 Southern 
Malta 1997 1,98 2,11 6378 382791 ,0166618 9,68 Southern 
Malta 2017 
 
1,43 4501 467999 ,0096175 26,95 Southern 
Netherlands 1992 1,59 
 
186409 15184166  23,60 Conservative 
Netherlands 1997 1,56 1,59 178553 15610650 ,0114379 26,40 Conservative 
Netherlands 2017 
 
1,72 80000 17131296 ,0046698 48,22 Conservative 
Poland 1992 1,95 
 
-159999 38363667  2,46 PostComm 
Poland 1997 1,51 1,95 -85199 38649660 -,0022044 4,12 PostComm 
Poland 2017 
 
1,33 -50002 37974826 -,0013167 13,81 PostComm 
Portugal 1992 1,54 
 
149122 9952494  10,81 Southern 
Portugal 1997 1,47 1,54 173604 10108977 ,0171733 11,58 Southern 
Portugal 2017 
 
1,28 -30001 10300300 -,0029126 21,14 Southern 
Romania 1992 1,51 
 
-520001 22794284  1,10 PostComm 
Romania 1997 1,32 1,51 -610000 22553978 -,0270462 1,59 PostComm 
Romania 2017 
 
1,52 -150000 19587491 -,0076580 10,81 PostComm 
SlovakRep 1992 1,93 
 
-15108 5305016  2,91 PostComm 
SlovakRep 1997 1,43 1,93 -2964 5383291 -,0005506 5,14 PostComm 
SlovakRep 2017 
 
1,34 4999 5439232 ,0009191 17,60 PostComm 
Slovenia 1992 1,33 
 
-17461 1996498  
 
PostComm 
Slovenia 1997 1,25 1,33 1487 1985956 ,0007488 10,45 PostComm 
Slovenia 2017 
 
1,58 6002 2066388 ,0029046 23,60 PostComm 
Spain 1992 1,31 
 
319270 39157685  16,07 Southern 
Spain 1997 1,15 1,31 905020 40057389 ,0225931 14,70 Southern 
Spain 2017 
 
1,32 200000 46593236 ,0042925 28,16 Southern 
Sweden 1992 2,09 
 
156460 8668067  32,34 SocialDemo 
Sweden 1997 1,52 2,09 58470 8846062 ,0066097 29,90 SocialDemo 
Sweden  2017  1,52 200000 10057698 0,0198853 53,44 SocialDemo 
UK 1992 1,79 
 
205443 57580402  20,49 Liberal 
UK 1997 1,72 1,79 498998 58316954 ,0085567 26,62 Liberal 
UK 2017 
 
1,92 900000 66058859 ,0136242 39,72 Liberal 
N 
 
56 56 84 84 56 84 
 
  
Appendix 3 
Table 2: Model Summary and Coefficients: Multiple regression analyses year 1997. Dependent 
variable: Net migration rate per capita 
Source: own estimates from the World Bank Data 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2019. 
N = 28  
Significance levels: * = p <0,1 ** = p <0.05 *** = p <0.01  
Standard error of coefficients in brackets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression analyses 
including Luxembourg 
     
 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Lagged TFR 0,029 
(0,015) 
0,019 
(0,012) 
0,022 
(0,014) 
0,029 ** 
(0,010) 
0,028 * 
(0,16) 
GDP per capita  0,001** 
(0,000) 
0,001 
(0,001) 
0,002*** 
(0,001) 
0,002** 
(0,001) 
EU membership   0,005 
(0,013) 
 -0,002 
(0,017) 
Welfare state regime 
(social democratic as ref.cat) 
     
Liberal    0,015  
(0,012) 
0,015 
(0,012) 
Conservative    0,015  
(0,10) 
0,015 
(0,010) 
Southern    0,048 *** 
(0,013) 
0,047 ** 
(0,015) 
Post-Communist    0,028 * 
(0,016) 
0,026 
(0,025) 
Constant   -0,023  -0,042 -0,046 -0,097 -0,091 
𝐑𝟐  0,050 0,369 0,374 0,577 0,715 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 0,013 0,319 0,295 0,503 0,615 
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Table 3: Model Summary and Coefficients: Multiple regression analyses year 2017. Dependent 
variable: Net migration rate per capita 
Source: own estimates from the World Bank Data 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2019. 
N = 28  
Significance levels: * = p <0,1 ** = p <0.05 *** = p <0.01  
Standard error of coefficients in brackets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression analysis  
including Luxembourg 
   
 2017 2017 2017 
Lagged TFR -0,013  
(0,011) 
-0,013  
(0,009) 
-0,011  
(0,014) 
GDP per capita  0,001***  
(0,000) 
0,000 ** 
(0,000) 
Welfare state regime 
(socialdemocratic as ref.cat) 
   
Liberal   -0,002  
(0,008) 
Conservative   0,004  
(0,007) 
Southern   0,001  
(0,010) 
Post-Communist   -0,006  
(0,009) 
Constant   -0,014 0,010 0,011 
𝐑𝟐  0,047 0,587 0,638 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 0,011 0,554 0,534 
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Table 4: Model Summary and Coefficients: Multiple regression analyses year 1997. Dependent 
variable: Net migration rate per capita 
Source: own estimates from the World Bank Data 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2019. 
N = 25  
Significance levels: * = p <0,1 ** = p <0.05 *** = p <0.01  
Standard error of coefficients in brackets  
                                                 
22 Please note that the division of post-communist countries are identical with the non EU member states in 1997 
when excluding Malta and Cyprus. The two last models are therefore the same, except different values of the 
constant.  
Regression analyses excluding 
Malta, Cyprus and 
Luxembourg  
     
 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Lagged TFR -0,005 
(0,015) 
-0,005 
(0,012) 
0,005 
(0,011) 
0,018 
(0,016) 
0,018 
(0,016) 
GDP per capita  0,001** 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,001) 
0,001 
(0,001) 
0,001 
(0,001) 
EU membership   0,032** 
(0,012) 
 -0,006 
(0,028) 
Welfare state regime 
(social democratic as ref.cat) 
     
Liberal    0,011 
(0,012) 
 0,011 
(0,012) 
Conservative    0,009 
(0,012) 
0,009 
(0,012) 
Southern    0,031 
(0,021) 
0,031 
(0,021) 
Post-Communist22    0,006 
(0,028) 
- 
 
Constant   0,010 -0,003 -0,018 -0,051 -0,045 
𝐑𝟐  0,005 0,340 0,512 0,572 0,572 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 -0,038 0,280 0,442 0,429 ,0429 
  
Appendix 6  
 
Table 5: Model Summary and Coefficients: Multiple regression analyses year 2017. Dependent 
variable: Net migration rate per capita 
Source: own estimates from the World Bank Data 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2019. 
N = 25 
Significance levels: * = p <0,1 ** = p <0.05 *** = p <0.01  
Standard error of coefficients in brackets  
 
Regression analyses excluding 
Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg 
   
 2017 2017 2017 
Lagged TFR 0,016*  
(0,009) 
-0,009 
(0,010) 
-0,012 
(0,013) 
GDP per capita  0,001*** 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,000) 
Welfare state regime 
(social democratic as ref.cat) 
   
Liberal   -0,001 
(0,008) 
Conservative   0,001 
(0,007) 
Southern   -0,011 
(0,012) 
Post-Communist   -0,015 
(0,012) 
Constant   -0,022 0,003 0,027 
𝐑𝟐  0,118 0,458 0,543 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 0,080 0,408 0,390 
